Articles & Papers
Aquinas on Hierarchy and Servitude
From real differences among men to ordered rule, and why Aquinas calls no man a slave by nature.
Download the full PDF One-page summary (PDF)Aquinas does not teach that certain men possess a natural essence of “slave.” He argues that nature establishes real differences in capacity, and those differences support ordered relationships of rule and subjection. Slavery as a legal institution belongs to the ius gentium, the law of nations, and Aquinas calls it “natural” only in a secondary sense: reason can judge it useful under the conditions of fallen human life.
01. Two Kinds of Subjection ST I, Q.92, A.1, AD 2
The superior makes use of the subject for his own benefit. Began after sin. This is slavery proper.
The superior governs the subject for the subject’s own benefit and good. Existed before sin. Household and political order belong here.
For good order would have been wanting in the human family if some were not governed by others wiser than themselves.
ST I, Q.92, A.1, AD 2 · see also I, Q.96, A.402. Two Senses of “Natural” ST II-II, Q.57, A.3
What belongs to a thing in itself, as male and female are ordered to offspring. Nothing in this man’s nature makes him a slave rather than that man.
What reason judges fitting because of what follows from it, as with private property. Servitude can be useful to the one ruled and the one who rules.
Slavery which belongs to the right of nations is natural in the second way, but not in the first.
ST II-II, Q.57, A.3, AD 2Cross-references: I-II, q.94, a.5, ad 3 places slavery beside the division of property as devised by human reason for the benefit of human life — an addition to natural law, not a change to it. Suppl., q.52, a.1 calls slavery contrary to nature’s first intention but not its second, introduced as a penalty of sin.
03. The Argument, Step by Step
1. Men share one nature but differ in natural capacities.
2. Different capacities fit men for different functions.
3. Ordered society requires different men holding different offices.
4. Equality of nature therefore does not mean equality of authority.
5. The less capable benefit from being governed by the wiser.
6. Rule directed to the subject’s good is natural.
7. Servile subjection, rule for the master’s benefit, enters with sin.
8. Reason can still judge particular servitude useful under fallen conditions, so it is natural in the second sense and not the first.
The pivot is the Fall. Everything before it is hierarchy; slavery enters only after it, and only as reason’s judgment about fallen conditions.
04. Limits on the Master ST II-II, Q.104, A.5
Following Seneca, Aquinas holds that servitude reaches the body and not the soul. In the inner movements of the will, a man owes obedience to God alone. Even in bodily matters the master’s authority stops short: in what touches the nature of the body the servant is not bound — sustaining his own life, marrying, or remaining a virgin.
Since by nature all men are equal, he is not bound to obey another man in matters touching the nature of the body.
ST II-II, Q.104, A.505. The Biblical Material
Gen. 1:26–28 (dominion over creation) · Gen. 2:18–23 (the woman formed as a helper fit for him) · 1 Cor. 11:3, 8–9 · Eph. 5:22–25. In Aquinas’s scheme these are civil subjection, not servile.
Lev. 25:44–46 (buying permanent slaves) · Exod. 21:2–6 (a Hebrew servant freed in the seventh year) · Eph. 6:5–9 · Col. 4:1 · 1 Pet. 2:18.
Exod. 21:16 (man-stealing is capital) · Deut. 23:15–16 (an escaped slave not returned) · 1 Cor. 7:21 · Philem. 15–16 · Gal. 3:28 · 1 Tim. 1:10 (enslavers listed among the lawless).
06. Where the Argument Is Pressed
Leviticus 25 grounds permanent servitude in nationality, not capacity. Israelite and foreigner are distinguished by covenant membership, which does not fit the premise that the wiser rule the less capable.
Mutual benefit is an empirical claim about how the institution works. Where a master rules for his own gain, Aquinas’s own definition makes it servile subjection, a fruit of sin. The Atlantic trade rested on man-stealing, which Exodus 21:16 makes capital.
Paul III, Sublimis Deus (1537), forbade enslaving the peoples of the Americas. Leo XIII praised abolition in Brazil. Gaudium et Spes 27 lists slavery among infamies; Veritatis Splendor 80 counts it among intrinsically evil acts.
- Aquinas says all men are equal by nature and that some should rule others. Where exactly does he reconcile the two?
- If rule for the subject’s good existed before the Fall, what makes slavery different in kind and not only in degree?
- Does “useful to both parties” justify an institution, or only describe its best case?
SOURCES · Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (English Dominican trans., 1920): I, Q.92, A.1; I, Q.96, A.4; II-II, Q.57, A.3; I-II, Q.94, A.5; Suppl., Q.52, A.1; II-II, Q.104, A.5 · Scripture: ESV · Paul III, Sublimis Deus (1537) · Leo XIII, In Plurimis (1888) · Gaudium et Spes 27; Veritatis Splendor 80